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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RUSSELL BISNER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20000026-SC 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1996), and aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
FIRST ISSUE. Did the prosecutor's seeming failure to disclose alleged ''cooperation 
agreements" with state witnesses violate defendant's due process rights? 
Standard of Review. "A trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant or 
deny a motion for a new trial, and [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's decision absent 
clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998). 
I 
However, the Court "review[s] the legal standards applied by the trial court for correctness." 
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 28, 979 P.2d 799. 
SECOND ISSUE. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 
victim's drug debt to defendant under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, where that 
evidence was relevant to motive and intent? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on the admission of 
evidence under rule 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 
59, f 16,6 P.3d 1120. The Court reviews the record "to determine whether the admission of 
other bad acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in the proper 
exercise of that discretion.'" Id. {quoting State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 18,993 P.2d 837, 
cert, denied, 120 S.Ct. 1181 (2000)). 
THIRD ISSUE. Was the information obtained from the searches of defendant's home, 
conducted with consent of defendant's mother, properly considered as a basis for the search 
warrant? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the factual findings underlying a trial court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 
1996). The Court considers the facts "in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination" and will not find clear error unless the factual findings "are not adequately 
supported by the record." Id. The trial court's legal conclusions based on the facts are 
reviewed for correctness. Id. 
2 
FOURTH ISSUE. Did the trial court's manslaughter instruction, patterned after the 
instruction approved in State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861 (Utah 1998), 1 early explain 
extreme emotional disturbance? 
Standard of Review, iv- opriety of a jury instruction is a conclusion of law 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). 
FIFTH ISSUE. Did the trial court properly deny defendant s mum m i merge his 
aggravated robbery conviction with his murder conviction ? 
Standard. if Review, Merger presents a question of law reviewed for correctness, with 
no deference given to the trial court. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856,858-59 (Utah 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The interpretatio isions are relevant to a determination of this 
case 1> S (Diisi, amend. IV, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999), Utah R.Evid. 403, and 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). The relevant provisions are reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged by information with murder and aggravated robbery, both first 
degree felonies. R. 03-05. Defendant filed motions to quash ihe brndovM' ami to suppress 
evidence seized from Ins house, incliitling the murder weapon. R. 69-70, 81-97. After 
holding an tevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied both motions R 372-73, 418-23. 
Defendant filed a petition for interlocutory review of the order denying his n i on to 
suppress, which this Court denied. R '12 7 s 1, SI >2 • 1l * 
3 
Defendant filed a number of pretrial motions, including motions to exclude evidence 
of the victim's drug debt to defendant, R. 504-07, and to exclude testimony from any State 
witnesses with whom the State made any undisclosed "agreements, inducements, offers of 
leniency, or other understandings" for their cooperation or testimony. R. 549-50. The court 
heard argument on the motion to exclude the drug debt evidence after the jury had been 
empaneled and opening statements given. R. 551,893. The court denied the motion. R. 
893: 7. The trial court did not immediately rule on the motion to strike. 
Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict after the State rested. R. 559-
60; R. 891: 283. He also argued the testimony of Chris Lyman, a State witness, should be 
stricken because the State did not disclose an alleged "cooperation agreement" with Lyman. 
R. 560; R. 891: 278-83. That motion was denied R. 560; R. 891: 283-85. The defense 
rested without presenting evidence. R. 560. Thejury found defendant guilty on both counts, 
and further found that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
murder. R. 598-600, 604; R. 888: 4-6. 
Nineteen days after the verdict, but before sentencing, defendant unsuccessfully 
moved to merge the aggravated robbery conviction with the murder conviction. R. 608-17, 
637; R. 895: 3-8. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to consecutive prison terms of five-
years-to-life on each count plus an additional one-year term for use of a firearm. R. 636-37; 
R. 895: 26-27. 
Defendant timely moved for a new trial, renewing his argument that the State did not 
disclose the alleged "cooperation agreement" with Chris Lyman. R. 642-43. The trial court 
4 
denied the motion. R. 685, 730. After the trial court announced its decision denying the 
motion, but before it entered a final written order, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the 
denial of the motion for a new . 687-88. That motion was never decided by the trial 
court ^ defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial. R. 732. 
In an effort to obtain a ruling on his motion to reconsider, defendant mt ved to dismiss 
the appeal without prejuc . * .mon to reconsider. This Court 
denied the motion, holding that a motion to reconsider is not valid under the rules and that 
"[t]he trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider anything further in this case because defendant 
timely filed his notice of appeal." SeeOnki m'pinduu d in AildnuJutii Hi 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of January 6, 1999, defendant fatally shot Darby Golub 
with an assault rifle as Darby attempted to flee to safety. R. 890 145 4<>, I I; k K*H 183, 
201,245-47, JM-t>0, J69-70 l 
Sometime between 9:00 and 10:30 the night before, defendant and his friend Derek 
Pearson visited Chris Lyman at his Sandy apartment to purchase LSD. R. 889: 3-4,21. The 
two visited Lyman for fifteen to twenty minutes. K NS'1-* -1 « ,"7" I Hnuui thfiru indorsation, 
defendant told 1 yiii.tn thai IK; was yoing to meet someone that night who owed him money. 
lOn appeal, the Court "reviewfs] the record facts in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict" and the State therefore "recitefs] the facts accordingly." State v. Brown, 
948 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997). Conflicting evidence is included "only as necessary to 
understand issues raised on appeal" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f2, 10 P.3d 346. 
5 
R. 889: 05. As the two left Lyman's apartment, defendant declared, "Someone is going to 
die tonight." R. 889: 5; see also R. 889: 22-24. 
After leaving Lyman's apartment, the two went to the home of Justin Koontz where 
other friends had gathered to party. See R. 890: 56-57; see also R. 890: 4-5,93-94. Justin's 
mother was working that evening at a nearby 7-Eleven and his father was upstairs sleeping. 
R. 890: 10-11, 14-15, 94, 99. The friends partied downstairs into the early morning hours 
of the next day, drinking alcohol and using drugs, R. 890: 5-6, 10, 57, 94, 113-14.2 
Defendant had discussed with his friends a $350 drug debt Darby owed him. See R. 
890: 8-9,58-59. From the party, defendant telephoned Darby, leaving a message that he was 
supposed to have paid on the drug debt that day. R. 890:58-59. At approximately 2:00 a.m., 
Darby returned the call. R. 890:6,9-10,94-96. Darby yelled at Justin because of a late call 
to his house that night and Justin rejoined with a similar complaint, R. 890: 95,112. After 
speaking with Justin, Darby spoke with Dustin Symes, another of defendant's friends. R. 
890: 4-6, 34, 58-59, 94. Darby again complained of the late call to his house, and after an 
angry exchange of words, they agreed to meet in the parking lot of the Canyon Center, a 
nearby shopping center, to settle the dispute. See R. 890: 7-8, 13-14, 34-35, 51, 60-61.3 
2Derek Pearson, who had accompanied defendant to Lyman's house, testified that 
he had been smoking marijuana most of the night and that he took six "hits" of LSD at 
approximately 11:00 that evening. R. 890: 57, 79. Justin Koontz also acknowledged at 
trial that he had smoked marijuana that evening. R. 890: 114. 
3The Canyon Center, similar to a strip mall, includes a Smith's grocery store on the 
west end, a Shopko at the east end, and a variety of smaller businesses in between. A 
large parking lot lay to the south of the businesses. See State's Exhibit (SE) 4 (the 
exhibits are included in the record in two un-indexed envelopes); R. 890: 13-14, 36, 162, 
6 
After hanging up, Dustin discussed the called with defendant, Derek, and Justin, and 
considered the possibility of taking guns. R. 890: 9-10, 35-36, 60-62, 78.4 Anticipating a 
fight, the four left in Dustin's truck to meet I Virhv al the Canyon Center parking lot. R. 890: 
8-12, 36, 39, 53, 61-62, 98. Finding no one there, Dustin drove to the 7-Eleven located on 
the southeast corner of the parking lot where Justin's mother was working that evening R 
890:13-14,61-62,99. Defendant, Dustin, andDati leti'i-unal uiitside,, i.ilkmg with Justin's 
mother who v\a,s on break smoking a cigarette. R. 890: 14, 37, 62-63, 78-79, 138-39, 152. 
Justm went inside, helped himself to the condiment bar, and spoke with another 7-Eleven 
employee. R. 890: 15, 63, 78, 99, 137-38, 152 
After a few minutes at the '-Htna» ihc'hn.v Iririuk outside saw Darby's truck pull 
mint in i hie (\\tw mi ( Vnter parking lot just south ofthe middle businesses. SeeR. 890:14-16, 
37-39, 63-64, 73-74, 99, 139; SE 6. Justin's mother went back into the convenience store 
and notified her son of Darby's arrival. See R. 890: I \\) I ^lenielv .igime'i iii*l "ipse?, 
Justin ran out of the store anil |omed his hieiuls in 1 hi tin's truck. R. 890: 17, 64, 99-100. 
As Justm exited the store, either he or his mother exclaimed, "That chicken shit wouldn't 
i • 
i 
show up." R. 890:140,153. After Justin left, his mother remarked to her co-worker, "I just 
168. A Rainbo Mart and a /-fcieven sit on the southern-most borders ofthe Canyon 
Center parking lot, facing 9400 South—the Rainbo gas station sits directly south ofthe 
middle businesses and the 7-Eleven sits in the southeast corner. See SE 4; R. 890: 14, 
146, 163; R. 891: 176. Witnesses referred to the parking lot as either the Shopko or the 
Smith's parking lot. See R. 890: 8,13-14, 36, 61 64 97 100 114 140-41; R. 891: 175. 
4
 Although both Dustin and Justin denied any talk of weapons, R. 890: 43, 98, 115, 
Derek testified they did have that discussion. R. 890: 60, 62, 78. 
7 
sent him down to a fight at the Smith's. I guess that's not a very good mother to send him 
down to do that." R. 890: 140. 
Dustin parked his truck kitty-cornered to Darby's truck some twenty to thirty feet 
away. R. 890: 17-18, 38, 64-65, 100-01, 116, 141-42, 154. Darby, who was alone, exited 
his truck and stood with an assault rifle cradled in his arms. R. 890: 19-21, 38-39, 41, 54, 
65, 101-02. Defendant and his friends exited their truck and quickly advanced on Darby. 
R. 890: 18-23, 66-68, 102-05. Although he had a rifle, Darby simply backed up as they 
advanced and made no threat with the weapon. R. 890: 103.5 He did not fire the rifle nor 
did he use it to otherwise defend himself. R. 890:21,66-68,90, 105. Dustin, who brought 
with him an aluminum baseball bat, thrust the bat at Darby, cutting his forehead, knocking 
him backward, and causing him to drop the rifle. R. 890:12-13,21 -23,43-44,46,54-55,68, 
103-04. Justin followed with a punch to Darby's leg. R. 890: 104-05. Having disarmed 
Darby, Dustin returned to his truck and Justin followed. R. 890:23-24,44-45,105,120-22. 
Confused, Darby asked, "Why are you doing this?" R. 890: 69, 83. Darby was eventually 
forced to the ground as defendant and Derek continued to beat on him for some thirty 
seconds. R. 890: 22-24,44-45,66-68, 83,104-05,143. Dustin yelled for his friends to get 
back in the truck and all but defendant complied. R. 890: 24-25,47, 69, 84, 105-06, 121. 
5Dustin Symes testified that he never saw Darby point the gun at them, R. 890: 19-
20, 38-39,41, 54, and Justin Koontz testified that he didn't remember Darby pointing the 
gun at them. But see R. 890: 102 (claiming Darby was waiving the gun). Only Derek 
Pearson, who acknowledged he was high on alcohol and drugs, testified that Darby 
pointed the gun at them. R. 890: 65-66, 82. 
8 
Just as the three were climbing back into Dustin's truck, Darby lifted himself off the 
ground, got into his truck, closed the door, and began speeding away through the park inn hi 
R. 890: 144, 157. Meanwhile, defendant, picked up the nfk, cocked it, and fired three 
successive rounds ,u Drirhv as he fled in his truck. R. 890: 25-27, 70-71, 106-08, 123, 128-
29. Although the shots missed Darby, at least one round broke one of the truck's windows. 
See R. 890: 27; R. 891: 185, 196-97, 252. As Darby continued to speed away ihrough "he 
parking lot, defendant (unl jfiothei ffinv iminds Vtv R. 890: 145, 159; R. 891: 183, 192, 
197. 1'h i s 11 me, one of the rounds grazed the driver's door, pierced the window, and fatally 
struck Darby in the back of the head. See R. 890: 145-46, 159; R XYI 183, 201, 245 47, 
251-60, 269-70; SE 21; SE 22. 
j \ rter 1 * imy •* as struck hv the fatal bullet, his truck continued straight through the 
parking lot towards the Rainbo gas station It ran over a parking island and small tree, 
jumped over a curb and snowbank bordering the gas station, ran over a .co Hid I rec, -ind hit 
a concrete trash can, causing the truck to >pm mil )t«, niidol before resting in the Rainbo 
parking lot K WO. 27-28,72,146,148; R. 891:180-81,183. By the time witnesses reached 
the truck, Darby was dead, slumped over onto the floor of the passenger side. K $•«-
49, 164-65. After defendant shot Darby, i HIMHI uimi1 tu.v- in (us urn k uth Derek and 
Justin, while l ini ' l i i i ! t V *m *oot through an alleyway between the stores at the shopping 
center. R. 890: 28,48, 72,109. 
Defendant was taken into custody a few hours later at his home R IS1-)1 2 15 < )nce 
defendant was in custody, police searched the home wlurre defendant lived with his mother 
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and other family members. R. 891: 204-05. Police found the assault rifle used to kill Darby 
partially hidden behind clothing in an open closet underneath the stairs. R. 891: 206-12.6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Nondisclosure of Cooperation Agreements* Defendant's due process rights were 
not violated by any apparent failure of the prosecution to disclose alleged cooperation 
agreements with State witnesses. A detective's agreement to seek a reduced jail sentence on 
behalf of Chris Lyman in an unrelated misdemeanor case was known to the defense before 
trial and explored during cross-examination. Therefore, any nondisclosure did not result in 
prejudice. An alleged deal not to prosecute Lyman for felony drug distribution was not an 
agreement, but a factual statement by the prosecutor to Lyman's attorney that the State could 
not prosecute his client because it could not independently prove the corpus delicti. In any 
event, the defense knew of the conversation at least by the close of the State's case and 
defendant therefore suffered no prejudice. Finally, defendant did not preserve his claims that 
the prosecution failed to disclose cooperation agreements with other State witnesses. 
II. Rule 404(b) Evidence. Evidence that the victim owed defendant money on a drug 
debt was admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. The evidence explained the 
purpose behind the confrontation with the victim and provided a motive for the murder. The 
evidence was also relevant to counter defendant's claim that in shooting the victim, he was 
acting under an extreme emotional disturbance. Any risk of unfair prejudice was minimal 
and did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. 
6Details of the search, elicited at a suppression hearing, are discussed in point III. 
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III. Suppression of Evidence. The cursory search of defendant's home for suspects 
following his arrest was conducted with the voluntary consent of defendant's mother and was 
otherwise justified as a protective sweep, Mt\ . se the initial search w as \ alid, the second 
search, also conducted with the consent of the mother, was not tainted. In any event, the 
second search was sufficiently attenuated from the first to be purged of the primary taint. 
The trial court, therefore, properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized 
from defendani •. home jiiiisiiiini in ,i -a? ovh warrmi miiai was based on the information 
obtained in the first two searches. 
IV. Manslaughter Instruction. The manslaughter instruction explaining "extreme 
emotional disturbance" accurately and clearly stated the law 1 < nitraiy to defendant •. claim, 
the tnsJiij iinn i mild not reii^nnahU he n»mi to mean that a knowing or intentional murder 
could not be reduced to manslaughter. The instruction was identical to an instruction this 
Court upheld against similar objections in State v. Piansiaksone, 954 F 2d 861 VI (! fah 
1998). Defendant has presented riu viable reason tor flii^  < "otiil in tei * insider that holding. 
V. Merger flu trial court properly denied defendant's motion to merge his 
aggravated robbery conviction with his murder conviction, which was charged under three 
alternative theories, including felony murder. I his < 'ouri squaiHy held in '^ MIV \ \h:Covey, 
803 P Id LI3'!, 1,.\W (Utah HWl, that aggravated robbery does not merge with non-capital 
felony murder. The distinction that this case involved only one victim, whereas McCovey 




DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED BY ANY 
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO DISCLOSE ALLEGED 
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH STATE WITNESSES. 
Defendant first alleges that the prosecutor failed to disclose so-called "cooperation 
agreements" with Chris Lyman, Dustin Symes, Derek Pearson, and Justin Koontz. Aplt. Brf. 
at 18-25. Defendant argues that the alleged failure violated his due process right to the 
disclosure of favorable evidence as articulated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 
1194 (1963), and its progeny. See Aplt. Brf. at 15-25. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR'S DUE PROCESS DUTY TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE. 
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution's failure to 
disclose "evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. The high court later 
expanded the rule to require disclosure even absent a request. United States v. Agurs, All 
U.S. 97, 107, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 2401 (1976). "[T]he prosecutor is not required to 
deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the 
accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial." United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,675,105 S.Ct. 3375,3380 (1985). While the duty to disclose plainly 
includes exculpatory evidence, it also embraces impeachment evidence. Id. at 676,105 S.Ct. 
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3380 {citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766 (1972)); see also 
State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, f9, 984 P.2d 975. 
Failure to disclose favorable evidence does nni, hune'in .intomatiL all\ lequin/a new 
trial. See Giglio, 405 U.S at 154,92 S.Ct. at 766. The nondisclosure of favorable evidence 
will result in constitutional error requiring reversal "only if the evidence is material in the 
sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Bagley, 473 
U.S. at 678, llh S ( 1 ,it ] \X I In ".um .i Hhniv \ lohihi in consists of ihe following three 
components: "[l]The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it 
is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by 
the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued ",|" Stnckler 
v. Gree - . << 1948 (1999). Reversal is not warranted 
unless the defendant can establish all three components. Id. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
CHRIS LYMAN'S TESTIMONY AND HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
. \ f ter the State rested, defendant moved to strike the testimony of Chris Lyman on due 
process grounds, arguing the prosecutor did not disclose alleged cooperation agreements with 
Lyman. R. 891: 278. Defense counsel alleged that Lyman was given promises of leniency 
in two distinct instances: (1) police agreed "o nvommtM"! ,i 'educed jail sentence for Lyman 
in an i tiirelated case, R. 891: 279; and (2) Lyman's attorney was told the State would forego 
felony prosecution based on his admitted drug distribution. See R. 891: 279-80. The 
prosecutor denied that any such promises or inducements were made. K. 81) 1: 2H2-H, H e 
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acknowledged that Lyman's attorney had called expressing concern about his client's 
admission that he sold defendant drugs. R. 891: 282. The prosecutor explained, however, 
that he told Lyman's attorney he would be unable to prosecute his client because no evidence 
of the crime existed other than Lyman's own admission. R. 891: 282-83. Thus, the 
prosecutor explained, no inducement was given. R. 891: 283. The trial court refused to 
strike the testimony and also denied defendant's subsequent motion for a new trial based on 
the alleged Brady violation. R. 560, 642-43, 685, 730; R. 891: 283-85. 
Defendant argues that the prosecution's failure to disclose the alleged agreements 
violated his due process rights under Brady.1 Aplt. Brf. at 18-23. Defendant's claim fails 
because he has not shown the presence of all three components of a Brady violation. 
L No Brady Violation Resulted from Any Failure to Disclose the 
Agreement to Seek a Reduced Jail Term for Lyman in an Unrelated 
Case. 
Defendant first complains the prosecutor did not disclose the detective's agreement 
to request that Lyman's jail sentence be reduced in an unrelated case in Sandy City. Aplt. 
Brf. at 19. Defendant has failed to show prejudice. The defense knew of the agreement days 
7Defendant also asserts that the prosecution's alleged failure to disclose the 
cooperation agreements violated his discovery rights under Utah R. Crim. P. 16, and his 
constitutional rights to confront the witnesses against him. Aplt. Brf. at 14-15, 26-27. 
Neither ground, however, was argued as a basis for either the motion to strike or the 
motion for a new trial. See R. 549-50, 642-59; R. 891: 278-81. This Court will not 
review claims not raised below absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. Monson 
v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). Because defendant has not argued the 
applicability of either exception, his new claims are not subject to appellate review. Id. 
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before trial and exposed the agreement to the jury while cross-examining Lyman. In a 
memorandum supporting defendant's motion for a new trial, the defense acknowledged: 
A few days prior to trial, counsel for Defendant learned during a phone 
call to counsel for the State that Chris Lyman was being called as a witness. 
A defense investigator contacted Lyman to discuss his expected testimony and 
learned that at the time Lyman first spoke to police he had a pending 
misdemeanor charge, and that after he gave his statement, someone spoke to 
the judge on his behalf and he got eight days off of a ten day sentence, the 
dismissal of a fine and "something else." 
R. 645. Thus, the defense suffered no prejudice because it knew of the arrangement with the 
detective before trial began and used it to his advantage at trial. 
Courts have almost universally held that undisclosed evidence known to the defense, 
or which should have been known to the defense, does not result in a Brady violation. See, 
e.g., United States v. Pandozzi, 878 F.2d 1526, 1529-30 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Zackson, 6 F.3d 911,918 (2nd Cir. 1993); United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967,973 (3rd 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1990); Rector v. Johnson, 
120 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1120, 118 S.Ct. 1061 (1998); 
United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 846, 112 S.Ct. 
144 (1991); United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Quintanilla, 193 F.3d 1139,1149 (10th Cir. 1999), cert denied, — U.S. — 120 S.Ct. 1422 
(2000); United States v. Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 852, 
107 S.Ct. 184 (1986); but see In re Sealed Case No. 99-3096, 185 F.3d 887, 896-97 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (rejecting government's argument that defendant should have learned of the 
cooperation agreement from the witness himself). In so concluding, these courts have relied 
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on one of two rationales. The Second Circuit reasons that under the Brady doctrine, 
"[ejvidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew, or should have known, of the 
essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." United States 
v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610,618 (2nd Cir. 1982) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1174, 
103 S.Ct. 823 (1983); see also Pandozzi, 878 F.2d at 1529-30 (1st Cir.); Perdomo, 929 F.2d 
at 973 (3rd Cir.); Rector, 120 F.3d at 560 (5th Cir.); Clark, 928 F.2d 733 at 738 (6th Cir.). 
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit reasons that such undisclosed evidence does not result 
in a Brady violation because it is not material. The Tenth Circuit observed: 
[W]hether a defendant knew or should have known of the existence of 
exculpatory evidence is irrelevant to the prosecution's obligation to disclose 
the information. The only relevant inquiry is whether the information was 
exculpatory. Nevertheless, a defendant's independent awareness of the 
exculpatory evidence is critical in determining whether a Brady violation has 
occurred. If a defendant already has a particular piece of evidence, the 
prosecution's disclosure of that evidence is considered cumulative, rendering 
the suppressed evidence immaterial. 
Quintanilla, 193 F.3d at 1149 (citations, internal quotations omitted). Under either theory, 
no Brady violation resulted here because defendant already knew of the jail-reduction deal. 
Moreover, the defense fully exposed the agreement at trial. Lyman acknowledged on 
cross-examination that he and a detective talked about whether he could "get out of some jail 
time" if he cooperated and gave a statement in connection with defendant's case. R. 889: 8-
10. He testified that when he gave his statement to police, they told him that "they'd see 
what they could do" to reduce a ten-day sentence to two days. R. 889: 11-12. He further 
testified that although the detective warned him he could not guarantee anything, he in fact 
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only served two days in jail. R. 889: 11-12. Armed with this information, defense counsel 
argued at length in his closing argument that Lyman's testimony was not to be believed 
because it was given in exchange for a reduced jail sentence. R. 894: 38-40. Defense 
counsel also pointed out Lyman's reluctance to admit any deal and that he in fact only served 
two days in jail as hoped. R. 894: 39-40. He further sought to discredit the testimony by 
arguing police purposely kept the agreement secret. In closing, defense counsel reminded 
the jury of testimony from the preliminary hearing that the detective told Lyman, with a wink, 
that he could not promise him anything "because it will look bad in court"—that "[t]hey will 
think the deal was made for you to talk and you could have made it up." R. 894: 40. 
This Court has recognized that there can be no prejudice to a defendant when the 
undisclosed evidence is nonetheless submitted to the jury. State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7-8 
(Utah 1993) (the undisclosed evidence was not submitted to the jury until after they began 
deliberations). 859 P.2d at 4. Any impeachment value the jail-reduction agreement might 
have had "was not lost, and any substantial prejudice that might have occurred due to the 
prosecution's [alleged] misconduct was eliminated." Id. 
2. No Brady Violation Resulted from Any Failure to Disclose the 
Prosecutor's Statement to Lyman's Attorney That Lyman Would 
Not Be Prosecuted Based on His Admission He Sold Drugs. 
Defendant also alleged that Lyman's attorney sought for and obtained an agreement 
from the State not to prosecute Lyman on drug distribution charges based on his statement 
that he sold defendant drugs on the night he and Derek Pearson visited him. R. 642; see also 
R. 891: 279-80. Defendant contends the prosecutor did not disclose the alleged agreement 
17 
not to prosecute Lyman and that he is thus entitled to a new trial. Aplt. Brf. at 19. This claim 
fails because (1) the prosecution made no such agreement, and (2) the defense learned of the 
conversation before the State rested and therefore had ample opportunity to use it in his case. 
a. There Was No Agreement to Forego Prosecution. 
When the defense alleged the Brady violation at the close of the State's case, the trial 
court found that no such agreement was reached. See R. 891: 283-84. The record supports 
that finding. When asked on cross-examination whether he received a deal for providing the 
information, Lyman testified, "No, . . . I was not given immunity or any kind of written 
statement that I would not be prosecuted." R. 889: 6-7. Moreover, when defense counsel 
alleged the existence of a no-prosecution deal, the prosecutor denied it, explaining: 
Yes, Mr. Lyman's attorney was concerned. I told him simply that 
because we certainly had no habias [sic]—we had no corpus of this crime, we 
wouldn't be able to prosecute his client because we had no evidence other than 
his statements that there was a crime committed. So there was no inducement. 
I didn't promise him I wouldn't prosecute him for his testimony. I just told 
him a simple fact[:] I couldn't prosecute him. 
R. 891: 282-83. The prosecutor's explanation is firmly rooted in the law. "An admission or 
a confession, without some independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti, cannot 
alone support a guilty verdict" State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977); accord 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,1162 (Utah 1991). Because Lyman did not expose himself 
to prosecution by making the statement, any promise by the prosecutor not to prosecute him 
based on that statement would have been illusory. 
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b. The Defense Knew of the Prosecutor's Conversation with 
Lyman's Attorney. 
Even assuming a deal was made, the defense was aware of it at least by the close of 
the State's case and no Brady violation therefore resulted. As noted above, undisclosed 
evidence otherwise known to the defense does not result in a Brady violation. See 
Quintanilla, 193 F.3d at 1149. This is true even when the defense does not become aware 
of the evidence until the trial. In Agurs, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the Brady rule 
applies to situations "involving] the discovery, after trial of information which had been 
known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense." 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 2397 
(emphasis added). The Brady rule does not, therefore, apply to favorable evidence 
discovered by the defense before or during trial. See United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 
1371 (6th Cir. 1994) (observing that "the Brady rule only applies to 'the discovery, after trial, 
of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense'"). 
The defense raised the alleged no-prosecution deal during trial immediately after the 
State rested. R. 891:278-79. How long before the State rested that defense counsel learned 
of the alleged agreement cannot be determined from the record—whether it was before trial 
or sometime during trial. In any event, the defense had ample opportunity to raise the issue 
before the jury. However, rather than having Lyman recalled, or calling Lyman in its case-in-
chief, the defense simply sought an order striking the testimony. The defense also ignored 
the court's offer to give a specific jury instruction on the effect of any such agreements on 
Lyman's credibility. See R. 891: 284-85. This "all-or-nothing" strategy did not seek to 
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remedy any error, but aimed to punish the prosecution, while at the same time obtaining a 
windfall. That approach does not comport with the rationale underlying the Brady rule. The 
principle behind the rule "is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor[,] but 
avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197. 
This case is not unlike United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365 (6th Cir. 1994). There, 
the prosecution did not disclose that, contrary to its evidence at trial, an uncalled witness 
denied paying any kickbacks. Id. at 1371. During trial, the defense approached the witness's „• 
attorney about testifying for defendant concerning payoffs alleged to have been made by the 
witness. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that "because [the witness's] denial was known by 
[defendant] in time for him to attempt to make use of it in his defense,... the government's 
failure to disclose that information did not violate due process under Brady'' Id. at 1371 -72. 
As in Mullins, because defendant here became aware of the alleged no-prosecution deal in 
time for him to use it in his defense, the State's failure to disclose it did not violate Brady. 
Moreover, allowing defendant to challenge the nondisclosure of an alleged agreement 
on appeal when he was aware of it during trial "would be sanctioning a procedure that fosters 
invited error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,159 (Utah 1989), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 
110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). Defendant is not entitled to both the benefit of not questioning a 
witness at trial about a known cooperation agreement and the benefit of objecting on appeal 
to the prosecution's failure to disclose the alleged agreement. See id. Such "'invited error' 
is procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially where ample opportunity has 
been afforded to avoid such a result." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987). 
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Defendant contends the prosecution tried to conceal the alleged agreement by 
repeatedly objecting to counsel's cross-examination of Lyman. See Aplt. Brf. at 21-22. 
Whether the prosecutor deliberately concealed the alleged agreement or did so innocently is 
not relevant to a Brady inquiry. A failure to disclose material, favorable evidence constitutes 
a Brady violation "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 3 73 
U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Moreover, the prosecution's objections were merely based 
on a lack of foundation: e.g., the witness's failure to identify who made the promises, R. 889: 
7, counsel's compound question of whether the detective talked to a city attorney or district 
attorney about a reduced jail sentence. R. 889: 8-9. 
In any event, even if the jury knew of the conversation, the evidence that defendant 
intentionally killed Darby was so overwhelming that it could not have affected the outcome 
of the trial. See infra, at 50. 
C. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE PROSECUTION DID NOT DISCLOSE 
ALLEGED COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER WITNESSES IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Defendant also argues that his due process rights were violated because the State did 
not disclose prosecution agreements with Justin Koontz, Derek Pearson, and Dustin Symes. 
Aplt. Brf. at 24. Because defendant did not preserve these claims in the trial court, he is 
precluded from raising them now. 
Defendant's motion to strike at the close of the State's case and his motion for a new 
trial after sentencing only alleged the nondisclosure of a cooperation agreement with Chris 
Lyman. See R. 642-59; R. 891: 278-81. It did not allege that the State failed to disclose 
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cooperation agreements with Koontz, Pearson, or Symes. Having failed to properly raise this 
claim in the trial court below, defendant is precluded from raising it for the first time on 
appeal unless he can show plain error or exceptional circumstances. Monson v. Carver, 928 
P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). Defendant, however, has not attempted to demonstrate the 
applicability of either exception. See Aplt. Brf. at 23-25. Accordingly, this Court should not 
reach his claim on appeal. See Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022. (declining to reach defendant's 
unpreserved claims because he did not attempt to show the applicability of either exception). 
Pearson and Koontz, Defendant first attempted to raise the issue with respect to 
Pearson and Koontz in his motion to reconsider the trial court's denial of his motion for a 
new trial. R. 687-88. However, the timely filing of his notice of appeal before a ruling on 
the motion foreclosed further consideration of the matter by the trial court. See State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 362 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that a "timely notice of appeal 
generally 'divests the trial court of further jurisdiction over a matter'"); Order. 
Even if defendant had properly preserved the claims pertaining to Pearson and 
Koontz, they fail on the merits. As explained above, favorable evidence not disclosed by the 
prosecution, but already known or which should have been known to the defense cannot form 
the basis for a Brady violation. Quintanilla, 193 F.3d at 1149. At the preliminary hearing, 
Derek Pearson testified that he was charged with third degree felony riot for his participation 
in the incident, but pled guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges for attempted riot and simple 
assault R. 886: 130. He also acknowledged that he was told to testify truthfully in 
defendant's case. See R. 886: 130-31. The defense, therefore, was fully aware that Pearson 
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had agreed to testify truthfully in defendant's case and that he had pled guilty to reduced 
charges. Justin Koontz did not testify at the preliminary hearing. However, in a sworn 
affidavit filed in response to defendant's motion to reconsider, the prosecutor attested that 
he had informed defense counsel that both Koontz and Pearson had pled guilty to reduced 
misdemeanor charges and that they were expected to testify truthfully for the State. R. 755. 
The defense was therefore well aware that the two witnesses received the benefit of 
pleading to reduced charges and were expected to testify in accordance with their statements 
to authorities.8 Moreover, both Koontz and Pearson acknowledged at trial that although they 
had been charged with felony crimes, they pled guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges. R. 
890: 76-77, 109-10, 134-35 (Koontz testifying that he had originally been charged with 
criminal homicide). Therefore, the necessary information from which the credibility of their 
testimony could be questioned was before the jury. Where the facts were known not only to 
the defense, but also to the jury, any failure to further disclose the deal in no way 
"undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678,105 S.Ct. at 
3381; see also Hay, 859 P.2d at 7-8 (recognizing that there can be no prejudice to a 
defendant when the undisclosed evidence is nonetheless submitted to the jury). 
Dustin Svmes. Defendant also alleges that a deal was reached and fulfilled in which 
the prosecutor appeared at Symes's sentencing and asked that his conviction "be reduced to 
8Apparently, the lead prosecutor was not aware that the witnesses had also agreed 
to testify consistently with their plea statements to Judge Thome. See R. 790 (State's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Motion for New Trial). 
However, this additional promise is no different than their promise to testify truthfully. 
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a misdemeanor, that he be sentenced to probation, and that he be given a lenient jail 
sentence." Aplt. Brf. at 25. Although defendant supplemented his motion to reconsider with 
an unofficial transcript of Symes's sentencing hearing, he did not raise the Symes claim in 
his motion. See 642-43,687-88. He is therefore precluded from raising the issue on appeal. 
See Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022. 
Nor does the unofficial transcript of Symes's sentencing hearing support the claim that 
such a deal was made. To the contrary, the prosecutor affirms that he told Symes's attorney 
"right from the beginning that he had to plead guilty as charged." R. 783. Although the 
unofficial transcript contains omissions because they were inaudible, the transcript clearly 
reveals that the prosecutor's decision to recommend sentencing for a class A misdemeanor 
came only after he heard the testimony at defendant's trial. See R. 783 (transcript reproduced 
in Addendum C). Defendant's claim of a deal is therefore unsubstantiated conjecture. 
The defense was also well aware the State would not oppose a more lenient sentence. 
At the preliminary hearing, Symes testified that he intended to plead guilty to aggravated 
assault. R. 886: 84. He acknowledged, however, that if he testified truthfully, the State 
agreed to advise the court that he cooperated and testified at defendant's trial. See R. 84-85. 
In short, any promise of leniency was made known to the defense and failure to provide 
further disclosure cannot be a basis of a Brady violation. 
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II. 
TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM'S DRUG DEBT TO DEFENDANT 
WAS PROPER, NONCHARACTER EVIDENCE. 
In his second claim on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to exclude testimony regarding the victim's drug debt to defendant, arguing that 
it constituted improper character evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, and 
that it was otherwise irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Aplt. Brf. at 28-31; R. 504-07, 551, 
893: 7. A review of the record reveals that after carefully examining the proposed testimony, 
the court properly exercised its discretion in concluding (1) the testimony was relevant to 
show "the purpose of th[e] gathering that resulted in [Darby] Golub's death," and (2) the risk 
of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence. R. 893: 7. 
A. ADMISSION OF BAD ACTS EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 404(b). 
Rule 404(b) governs the admissibility of bad acts evidence: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). The rule thus requires a three-part analysis in ascertaining whether bad 
acts evidence is admissible. First, the court determines whether "the evidence is actually 
being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as those specifically stated in the 
rule." Statev.Decorso, 1999UT57,f21,993 P.2d 837, cert,denied, 120S.Ct. 1181 (2000). 
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Second, the court assesses the evidence's relevancy under rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Id. at f 22. If the evidence meets the first two requirements, the court examines its prejudicial 
effect under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. at Tf 23. Under that rule, relevant evidence 
"may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. 
B. APPLICATION OF RULE 404(b) TO THE CHALLENGED DRUG DEBT EVIDENCE. 
Defendant challenges the admission of Chris Lyman's testimony. Lyman testified that 
when defendant and Derek Pearson visited him a few hours before the murder, defendant 
"mentioned that someone owed him a small amount of money, $300, something in that area, 
and that they were going to be meeting with this individual that night" R. 889: 5 (emphasis 
added). When the prosecutor asked Lyman whether defendant said anything else about that, 
Lyman testified, "Yeah, out of context, you know, kind of on the way out he said, 'Somebody 
is going to die tonight,' but... I don't know" R. 889: 5 (emphasis added). Defendant also 
challenges testimony of Dustin Symes and Derek Pearson: Symes testified that defendant told 
him Darby Golub owed him $350 for drugs, R. 890:8-9; and Pearson testified that defendant 
told him "and other people in the group" that Darby owed him money for drugs, R. 890: 59. 
1. Noncharacter Purpose of the Drug Debt Testimony. 
The State offered the drug debt evidence to demonstrate the purpose behind the 
confrontation and assault on Darby that night. R. 893: 6-7. The testimony also helped 
establish that defendant knowingly and intentionally killed Darby. Defendant's motive and 
intent to assault, and ultimately kill, the victim are valid, noncharacter purposes for admitting 
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the evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (stating that bad acts evidence may be admitted as 
proof of motive, intent, or absence of mistake or accident). 
Defendant contends that because Koontz, Pearson, and Symes each testified the fight 
was not over the drug debt, no link existed between the drug debt evidence and the shooting. 
Aplt. Brf. at 31. Thus, defendant reasons, the drug debt evidence could only be offered for 
the improper purpose of showing his propensity to commit crime. Aplt. Brf. at 31. That 
argument mistakenly assumes the court, or the jury for that matter, was required to accept the 
trio's testimony that the fight was not over the drug debt. A witness's testimony, while 
generally supporting the State's theory of the case, may in other aspects differ and even 
contradict that theory. This is especially true when participants in a crime agree to testify in 
the prosecution of one of their comrades. The fact finder is not bound to believe everything 
a witness testifies to, see Snyderville Transportation Co. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939,943 
(Utah 1980), and the prosecutor is free to present the case from "his or her viewpoint of the 
evidence." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1223 (Utah 1993). 
2. Relevancy of the Drug Debt Testimony. 
Because defendant argued that his actions were triggered by the unexpected and 
threatening conduct of a drug-crazed person, see R. 894: 33-38, evidence that he had a 
motive to kill Darby was critical to the State's case. As explained above, the drug debt 
evidence helped establish that defendant had a motive to kill Darby. See Utah R. Evid. 401 
(stating that '"[rjelevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence . . . more probable or less probable"). 
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Notwithstanding the trio's insistence the fight was not over drugs, defendant told Lyman just 
hours before the murder that he and Pearson were meeting someone who owed him 
approximately $300 later than night. R. 889: 5. Although defendant did not identify whom 
they were meeting, the jury could reasonably infer that it was in fact Darby Golub. See State 
v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 140-41 (Utah 1978) (holding the jury is "entitled to draw 
reasonable inferences from the facts shown to exist"). Pearson and Symes testified that 
defendant told them and others in the group that Darby owed him money for drugs. R. 890: 
8-9, 59. Symes testified that the debt was in the sum of $350. R. 890: 8-9. Pearson testified 
that defendant had left a message with Darby that evening indicating "he was supposed to 
pay [on the drug debt] that day." R. 890: 58-59. Neither Pearson, nor any of the other 
witnesses, testified that they or defendant met with anyone other than Darby later that night. 
Given the group's confrontation in the parking lot and the fatal shooting of Darby, the jury 
could reasonably infer from the evidence that defendant spoke of Darby and that it was he 
who was "going to die." R. 889: 5. 
Defendant argues that Pearson's testimony that defendant left a message for Darby 
earlier in the night should be disregarded because he neither observed nor heard defendant 
call Darby. Aplt. Brf. at 30. Pearson, however, may have been told by defendant of the call, 
and in any case, the testimony was given without objection. See R. 58-59. Moreover, 
Pearson's testimony that defendant had called Darby first was substantiated by the accounts 
of Darby's later telephone conversations with Koontz and Symes. Both testified that when 
Darby called them early that morning, he angrily complained about a telephone call from 
28 
them made late the night before. R. 890: 7, 34-35, 51, 94-95, 112. Darby would have no 
reason to make such a complaint had a prior message from defendant not been left. 
3. Risk of Unfair Prej udice. 
Finally, the probative value of the drug debt evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The defense disputed that the initial 
confrontation was over a drug debt, eliciting testimony that defendant was not angry about 
the debt and that the fight was in fact called on by Darby. R. 890: 35, 88. Moreover, the 
primary theory of the defense was that defendant acted under an extreme emotional 
disturbance triggered by the "drug-crazed" victim who unexpectedly exited his truck with an 
assault rifle after having allegedly threatened to kill the four friends. R. 894: 34-36. 
Accordingly, the State was required not only to prove that defendant intentionally or 
knowingly killed Darby, but also to refute the defense theory that defendant had no prior 
motive to kill Darby and no reason to shoot him but for his fear of the "drug-crazed" victim. 
Because the probative value of the evidence was at least equal to any risk of unfair prejudice, 
the trial court properly admitted the evidence under rule 403. See State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 
1135, 1141 (Utah 1989). 
III. 
THE MURDER WEAPON AND OTHER EVIDENCE WAS 
LAWFULLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S HOME 
Defendant next challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence 
seized from his home. Aplt. Brf. at 32-42. The challenged evidence, seized pursuant to a 
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valid search warrant, includes (I) the assault rifle used to kill the victim, R. 891: 207-12; 
SE18; (2) a photograph taken in the home showing the murder weapon almost completely 
hidden in a closet, R. 891:206-007; SE17; and (3) a photograph showing the murder weapon 
in the closet after police removed the clothing hiding it and also showing athletic pants with 
a silver chain attached. R. 891: 207-08, 210; SE16. 
Defendant does not allege the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. 
He instead contends that the information in the Affidavit for Search Warrant was illegally 
obtained from two warrantless searches of the house before the warrant was secured. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 33-42 (the Affidavit is reproduced in Addendum D). Evidence seized pursuant 
to a search warrant may be suppressed if the information establishing probable cause was 
obtained from a prior illegal search. United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458,1460 (10th Cir. 
1990); cf. State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986) (holding that any evidence 
obtained under an improperly issued warrant must be suppressed), cert denied, 480 U.S. 930, 
107 S.Ct. 1565 (1987). The issue on appeal, therefore, is whether the trial court properly 
considered the information obtained from the two searches conducted shortly after 
defendant's arrest in upholding the search warrant. See R. 418-23 (the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are reproduced in Addendum E). 
A. THE POLICE LAWFULLY SEARCHED DEFENDANT'S HOME FOR SUSPECTS 
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS ARREST. 
Officer Greg Severson responded to Canyon Center parking lot less than an hour after 
the murder. R. 887: 8-9. At the scene, Officer Severson learned that Justin Koontz, Dustin 
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Symes, and two other young men, Derek and Russell, were involved in a confrontation with 
the victim that led to the shooting. R. 887: 11-12. Officer Severson then went to the Koontz 
home where Derek Pearson and Justin Koontz were taken into police custody, leaving two 
suspects still at large. See R. 887: 36; R. 890: 30. Upon learning that defendant had 
telephoned Justin moments earlier, and after ascertaining defendant's name, address, and 
telephone number, Officer Severson, another Sandy City officer, and three sheriffs deputies 
responded to defendant's home, arriving at approximately 5:00 a.m. R. 887: 13-15, 38, 50. 
After securing the outer premises, Officer Severson called defendant on the telephone, 
asking him to come out and speak with him. R. 887: 15,38. When defendant came out one 
or two minutes later, police ordered him to the ground at gun point and placed him into 
custody. R. 887: 16,40. After putting defendant into his squad car, Officer Severson and 
another officer approached defendant's mother, Erin Stovall, who stood at the front door with 
her daughters. R. 887: 17-19. Although the officers carried weapons, both were holstered 
by this time. R. 887:19-20,51. Severson briefly explained that a shooting had occurred, that 
defendant had somehow been involved, and that he believed another suspect may be in her 
home. R. 887: 17,42. Officer Severson then asked Ms. Stovall for permission to check her 
home for the remaining suspect. R. 887: 18,43-44, 51. "She told [Officer Severson] to go 
ahead." R. 887: 18,43-44,51. 
After directing Ms. Stovall and her daughters to wait in the living room/kitchen area, 
R. 887:19,44, Officer Severson and another officer cleared the house, with guns drawn, for 
additional suspects. R. 887: 22-25. As he approached defendant's,bedroom downstairs, 
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Officer Severson observed a shotgun and assault rifle sitting in a gun rack through a partial 
opening in the draped entry of defendant's bedroom. R. 887: 21-22. The officers found no 
one else in the home and observed nothing else of particular significance. R. 887: 22, 25. 
The officers lawfully searched defendant's home pursuant to Ms. Stovall's consent. 
The search was also justified as a valid protective sweep for absconding suspects. 
1. Defendant's Mother Voluntarily Consented to the Search. 
Warrantless searches "'are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment— 
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) {quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 
88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967)); U.S. Const., amend. IV. One such exception is a search 
performed pursuant to consent Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 
2041, 2043-44 (1973), To fit within the exception, the consent must be voluntary and the 
burden rests with the prosecution to so establish. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. Even voluntary 
consent searches, however, will be deemed invalid if "consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of [a] prior illegality," Id. at 688. 
Defendant argues that the Court should adopt the three-part analysis for assessing 
consent searches articulated by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433 
(Utah App. 1996). Aplt. Brf. at 36-37. That analysis provides: 
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
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constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived.' 
Ham, 910 P.2d 439 (citations omitted, brackets in original, emphasis added). The three-part 
analysis was first adopted by the court of appeals in 1990 and was taken from the Tenth 
Circuit decision in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977). See State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). However, within one year of its adoption in Utah, 
the Tenth Circuit abandoned the three-part" Villano standard," named after the 1962 decision 
from which it originated, United States v. Villano, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962). United 
States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1991). This Court should also reject the 
Villano analysis, including the "clear and positive testimony" language which is but an 
extension of the presumption requirement. 
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Schneckloth expressly rejected the waiver approach 
upon which the Villano standard is based. The high Court observed that a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of rights has been applied only to the waiver of "those rights which the 
Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial," such as the 
right of counsel, the right to a speedy trial by jury, the right of confrontation, the right against 
being twice placed in jeopardy, and the right against compulsory self-incrimination. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 237-40, 93 S.Ct. at 2052-55. On the other hand, the Court 
observed, "[t]he protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and 
have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a fair trial." 
Id. at 242,93 S.Ct. at 2055. The Court thus held that "unlike those constitutional guarantees 
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that protect a defendant at trial, // cannot be said every reasonable presumption ought to be 
indulged against voluntary relinquishment" in the context of a consent to search. Id. at 243, 
93 S.Ct. at 2056 (emphasis added). The Court observed that "it would be next to impossible 
to apply to a consent search the standard of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege." Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
The Court concluded the test is no different than that for determining whether a 
confession is voluntary. Id. at 223-27, 93 S.Ct. at 2045-48. The Court held that "the 
question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress 
or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the 
circumstances." Id at 227,93 S.Ct. at 2047-48. Citing Schneckloth, this Court adopted that 
test in Arroyo, holding that "whether the requisite voluntariness exists depends on 'the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of police conduct."' 796 P.2d at 689 {quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226). 
In abandoning the Villano test, the Tenth Circuit explained: 
In subsequent consent search cases, we recited the Villano test without 
explicitly considering the intervening Schneckloth holding that the 
presumption against waiver should not be transposed from the trial rights 
context to the consent search context. Although we apparently did not rely on 
the presumption in any of these cases, we have retained the presumption 
language as part of our test for voluntariness of a defendant's consent to a 
search. In contrast to our position, every other circuit has followed 
Schneckloth by rejecting the waiver approach and employing the traditional 
"totality of the circumstances" test in this context. 
In light of the Schneckloth decision, we are convinced a district court 
determining the admissibility of evidence should not presume a defendant's 
consent to a search is either involuntary or voluntary. The voluntariness of 
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consent always must be determined from the totality of the circumstances The 
government, of course, has the burden of proving voluntary consent The 
general inquiry outlined in Villano and its progeny remains relevant. We find 
only the Villano test's application of the presumption against waiver improper 
Price, 925 F.2d at 1271 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). Notwithstanding 
Schneckloth and the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the Villano waiver analysis a decade ago, 
the Utah Court of Appeals has repeatedly applied the standard, most recently in State v 
Hansen, 2000 UT App. 353, ff 18-25,410 Utah Adv. Rep. 28.9 See, e g .State v Sterger, 808 
P.2dl22,127(UtahApp. 1991);Statev Grav/er, 808 P.2d 133,136(UtahApp. \99\)\State 
v Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993), affd without applying Villano 
standard, 910 P,2d 1196 (Utah 1996); State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 
1994); Ham, 910 P.2d at 439. This Court should expressly reject defendant's invitation to 
adopt the Villano test, adhering instead to Schneckloth Ps totality of the circumstances test as 
in Arroyo. 
When determining whether a consent was voluntarily given under the totality of the 
circumstances, this Court considers the following factors: "1) the absence of a claim of 
authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers, 
3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner [ ]; and 5) the absence of deception 
or trick on the part of the officer." State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
9In Hansen, the court of appeals expressly applied the presumption against waiver, 
not even acknowledging the State's argument that in light of Schneckloth and Price, the 
Villano standard was no longer good law. Hansen, 2000 UT App. 353 at f 25. 
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An examination of the search for suspects under the totality of the circumstances 
supports the trial court's conclusion that Ms. Stovall voluntarily consented to the search. R. 
422 fl[2). The officers claimed no authority to search, they did not exhibit a show of force, 
nor did they resort to deception in gaining consent. Indeed, Ms. Stovall was cooperative 
throughout. See R. 887:26. Moreover, Officer Severson testified that she was calm, though 
surprised, and appeared to comprehend what he told her. R. 887: 26. 
Defendant contends the officers made a show of authority when they allegedly stepped 
inside the doorway to speak with the mother. Aplt. Brf. at 38. Officer Severson in fact did 
not recall whether he and the other officer stood just outside the door on the porch or just 
inside the door when they first spoke with defendant's mother. R. 887: 17, 42. However, 
whether he spoke with her just outside or inside the door makes no difference under these 
circumstances. This was not a situation where the officers entered the house unannounced 
or against the protests of the homeowner. See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385,389 (Utah 1986) 
(finding consent for officer to follow defendant into his bedroom when he admitted officer 
into his home and made no objection when officer followed him). Instead, having just taken 
Ms. Stovall's son into custody, the officers simply approached her to explain their actions 
and seek her consent to search for the remaining suspect. R. 887: 18. The officers claimed 
no authority to search the house or be in the home, but merely requested permission to search 
the home and explained the reason behind their request. See R. 887: 17-18,44. 
Defendant further argues that the presence of several officers on the scene, the 
officers' use of weapons when taking defendant into custody, and the officers' "physical 
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touching" of defendant are factors weighing against a finding of voluntary consent. Aplt. 
Brf. at 38-39. These factors, however, are irrelevant to whether defendant s mother gave 
voluntary consent. The weapons might have been drawn in her direction momentarily 
because she was near defendant when he first opened the door. R. 887: 16, 41. However, 
the officers ordered defendant at gunpoint, not his mother, to exit the house with hands over 
his head, to proceed past the front of the house, to turn around, and to go down on his knees. 
R. 887: 16,40. The mother, on the other hand, was simply told to go inside the house as they 
completed the arrest. R. 887: 86. Only after defendant was handcuffed and safely placed 
into a police car did the two officers approach defendant's mother to speak with her. R. 887: 
16-17,19-20,40-41,51. Even though both officers carried a weapon, each had, by this time, 
secured his weapon in his holster. R. 887: 19-20, 51. 
Defendant also points to testimony that the officers refused Ms. Stovall's request to 
accompany them during the search and that they did not holster their weapons after the arrest, 
but kept them drawn until after the protective sweep. Aplt. Brf. at 38-39. However, the trial 
court rejected that testimony as not credible "[b]ecause of the inconsistencies between Ms. 
Stovall and [her daughter's] testimonies, the highly charged emotional state of mind they 
were in at the time of the incident, and the fact that they had no notes or recorded statements 
to assist them." R. 422 ( 29). Defendant has not challenged the court's factual findings and 
he cannot therefore rely on that testimony on appeal. Moreover, the court's findings were 
adequately supported by the unequivocal testimony of the officers. See State v. Troyer, 910 
P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1996) (holding that clear error will not be found unless the factual 
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findings uare not adequately supported by the record"). Officer Severson testified that Ms. 
Stovall gave her consent and that the officers drew their holstered weapons only when they 
commenced the protective sweep. R. 887: 18-20, 51. Moreover, permitting the mother to 
accompany them would have posed a danger not only to themselves, but also to her. 
Given the foregoing circumstances, the trial court correctly concluded that Ms. Stovall 
voluntarily consented to the search of her home for the remaining suspect. 
2. The Search Was Justified as a Protective Sweep. 
The court also correctly concluded the search was a valid protective sweep. R. 422-23 
(f 3). "A 'protective sweep is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest 
and conducted to protect the safety of police officers and others. It is narrowly confined to 
a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding." Maryland 
v. Bute, 494 U.S. 325,327,110 S.Ct 1093,1094 (1990). Officers may conduct a protective 
sweep if they have "a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ ] the officer in 
believing that the area swept harborfs] an individual posing a danger to the officer or others/' 
Id. at 327, 110 S.Ct. at 1095. Whether a search constitutes a valid sweep is determined "on 
the basis of the facts and circumstances involved." Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391 n. 2. 
Defendant first argues that the search was not justified as a protective sweep because 
he was not taken into custody in his house. Aplt. Brf. at 33, 35-36. Defendant cites to 
United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773 (10th Cir. 1996), to support that proposition. Aplt. Brf. 
at 35. In Colbert, officers were armed with a warrant for defendant's arrest charging him 
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with escape in relation to previous convictions. Id. at 775. The police had the home of 
defendant's girlfriend under surveillance for three hours. Id. They were able to trace most 
of the defendant's movements inside the apartment, though they were unable to see the foot 
traffic in and out of the front door. Id. They knew that defendant's girlfriend lived at the 
apartment. Id. at 777. Moreover, Colbert appeared to be the only suspect and nothing 
suggests police intended to conduct further investigation at the scene. 
Colbert, however, expressly rejected a perse rule against protective sweeps following 
arrests outside the home. The court held that "in some circumstances, an arrest taking place 
just outside a home may pose an equally serious threat to arresting officers." Id. at 776. The 
court continued, observing that "the fact that the arrest takes place outside rather than inside 
the home affects only the inquiry into whether the officers have a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that a protective sweep is necessary by reason of a safety threat." Id. at 776-77. 
An evaluation of the facts and circumstances involved in this case reveals that the officers 
were justified in conducting the protective sweep, regardless of Ms. Stovall's consent. 
In contrast to Colbert, Officer Severson arrived at defendant's home just hours after 
the fatal shooting of Darby Golub; he was in the midst of a fluid and rapidly moving 
investigation. He did not have the luxury of placing defendant's home under surveillance 
for hours and he was wholly unaware of the occupants' movements inside the home. 
Although the officers had effected defendant's detention, they undoubtedly intended to 
remain on the scene to question defendant's mother concerning her son's whereabouts and 
what he was wearing the last time she saw him. See R. 887: 55-59. Because the 
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investigation was not complete at the home, police had a legitimate concern for their safety 
until the house was clear of additional suspects. And although the officers did not have any 
eyewitness information that the fourth suspect had concealed himself in the home, R. 887: 
37, the following circumstances, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, 
supported Officer Severson's belief that the fourth suspect may have been in the home: (1) 
a murder, implicating four young men, had occurred just a few hours earlier; (2) the officer 
understood, even if mistakenly, that all four suspects left the scene in the same vehicle, R. 
887: 36; (3) two suspects were apprehended about an hour earlier at the Koontz home, R. 
887: 36; (4) only moments earlier, defendant was apprehended, leaving one suspect still at 
large, R. 887: 19; and (5) defendant lied about his own whereabouts, claiming on the 
telephone that he had just awakened, R. 887: 15. 
Defendant counters that because the house was quiet and the residents told the officer 
no one else was in the home, the officer could not hold a reasonable belief anyone else was 
present. See Aplt. Brf. at 34. However, police are not obligated to take the word of 
residents, especially those who had been asleep in bed, nor can they safely assume that no 
one is concealed within a house merely because it is quiet. Defendant also contends that 
because the officer did not identify the fourth suspect by name, he had no basis to search. 
Aplt Brf. at 34. That fact, however, does not abate an officer's legitimate concern for safety 
when he knows a fourth suspect is still at large and may very well be hiding in the home. 
Finally, defendant argues that the search did not constitute a protective sweep because 
he was not then arrested, but only detained for questioning. Aplt. Brf. at 33-34. That 
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distinction is illusory and without significance under Bide. The underlying justification for 
a protective sweep is officer safety and the safety of others. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 
at 1098 (observing that "arresting officers are permitted under such circumstances to take 
reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while, making arrest"). This concern is valid 
whether the suspect has been formally arrested or has only been detained for questioning. 
As observed in Buie, just as officers are justified in frisking an individual for weapons in an 
investigatory stop, officers are likewise justified "in taking steps to assure themselves that 
the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons 
who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack." Id. at 333, 110 S.Ct. at 
1097-98. The risk of danger to officers is no different whether the defendant was arrested 
or only detained as a suspect or witness for questioning. See United States v. Meza-Corrales, 
183 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding the protective sweep of defendant's residence 
although his detention did not escalate to a full-blown arrest). 
Accordingly, notwithstanding defendant's argument to the contrary, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest were sufficient to create a reasonable belief 
that the fourth suspect may be hiding in the home, justifying a protective sweep. 
B. THE CONSENT SEARCH OF THE HOME FOR EVIDENCE FOLLOWING THE 
PROTECTIVE SWEEP WAS VALID. 
After Officer Severson cleared the house of suspects, he again spoke with Ms. Stovall, 
further explaining the shooting and her son's possible involvement. R. 887: 25. 
Approximately five minutes after the sweep, Officer Severson obtained the written consent 
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of Ms. Stovail to search the house for evidence. R. 887: 29-31, 47-48 (reproduced in 
Addendum F). The officers, however, did not immediately commence a search of the home, 
but waited for Detective Soper, who arrived some ten to fifteen minutes later. R. 887: 32. 
After being briefed by Officer Severson and speaking with Ms. Stovall, Detective Soper 
searched the home for evidence. R. 887: 33, 54-59. 
Because Detective Soper was concerned that defendant had previously paid rent, 
police did not search defendant's bedroom or the storage area underneath the stairs used by' 
defendant as a closet. R. 887: 62-65. Soper observed through the partially open entry into 
defendant's bedroom the guns in the gun rack and clothing matching the description given 
by defendant's mother. R. 887:61-62. He also saw from the common area outside the closet 
the mid-section of an assault rifle, later identified as the murder weapon, with the stock and 
barrel hidden behind clothes. R. 887: 65. He saw black pants with a silver chain matching 
the description of defendant's attire that night given by another witness. R. 887: 64. 
Detective Soper did not, at that time, remove any evidence observed in those areas 
controlled by defendant. R. 887: 66. He instead secured a search warrant based on the 
evidence he observed in the home. R. 887: 66-68, 76. With search warrant in hand, 
Detective Soper returned to the home with a search team near noon that day. R. 887: 68-69. 
At that time, police seized a number of items, including the guns seen in the gun rack, the 
athletic pants with the silver chain, and the assault rifle in the closet. R. 887: 70-72. 
Defendant does not contend that police coerced his mother's consent to the second 
search of the home or that her consent was otherwise involuntary. See Aplt. Brf. at 40-42. 
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Instead, he argues that the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the "illegal" 
protective sweep. Aplt. Brf. at 40-42. Because the protective sweep was valid, defendant's 
claim that the second search was tainted vanishes. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the protective sweep was invalid, the consent for the 
second search was sufficiently attenuated "to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417 (1963) (internal quotes omitted). In 
assessing "whether a consent is sufficiently attenuated from prior police illegality to permit 
the introduction of the resulting evidence^] . . . courts should consider 'the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct,' the 'temporal proximity' of the illegality and consent, 
and 'the presence of intervening circumstances.'" State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 
(Utah 1993) {quoting Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 691 n. 4). The Court then "balances] [ ] the 
relative egregiousness of the misconduct against the time and circumstances that intervene 
before consent is given." Id. at 1264. 
Here, the purpose of the officers' protective sweep was to ensure that another suspect 
had not secreted himself inside the house, R. 887: 17,42, thus posing a risk to the safety of 
officers and home occupants alike. That such was their purpose was bom out by the cursory 
nature of their search—they did not search for evidence, nor did they touch or handle 
anything, but limited their search to persons. R. 887: 22-25. Their purpose was not to 
achieve consent, nor was it to gather evidence. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264 (noting that 
"if the purpose of the misconduct was to achieve the consent, suppression of the resulting 
evidence clearly will have a deterrent effect and further analysis rarely will be required"). 
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Indeed, although they checked the closet for suspects, they did not see the partially hidden 
gun. See R. 887: 22, 25. Accordingly, any misconduct was not flagrantly abusive. 
The time interval between the sweep and Ms. Stovall's written consent to a second 
search was relatively short—approximately five minutes. R. 887: 47-48. However, other 
intervening factors dissipated any taint. Following the protective sweep, Officer Severson 
again explained the situation to Ms. Stovall. R. 887: 25. He returned to his car, obtaining 
a consent form and speaking with the scene commander. R. 887: 26. He asked the scene 
commander to request that a detective respond to the home. R. 887: 27. He returned to the 
kitchen where he explained the consent form to Ms. Stovall. R. 887:27-28. Ms. Stovall read 
the consent form and Officer Severson asked her to sign it "if she felt comfortable letting 
[him] look through her house/' R. 887: 29. Ms. Stovall signed the consent form without 
asking any questions. R. 887: 29.l0 In other words, after further explaining the situation to 
Ms. Stovall following the sweep, Officer Severson left her alone for a few minutes and then 
explained the consent. Moreover, the officers did not conduct an immediate search, but 
waited another ten to fifteen minutes for Detective Soper's arrival. R. 887:31-32. Upon the 
detective's arrival, Officer Severson briefed him on the events at the home. R. 887: 32-33, 
54. Detective Soper then spoke with Ms. Stovall privately. R. 887: 55. She told the 
detective she had last seen her son at 6:30 the previous evening and described the clothing 
he was wearing. R. 887: 56-57. Detective Soper learned that defendant had once paid rent, 
l0Only two officers were present in the house when Officer Severson explained the 
consent form. R. 887: 32. Their guns were holstered. R. 887: 28, 32. Ms. Stovall was 
"extremely calm" and she asked no questions. R. 887: 29. 
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but had not done so for two months. R. 887: 57. Detective Soper then reviewed the consent 
form with Ms. Stovall anew, reconfirmed that she had read the form and did not have any 
questions, and again asked her if police could search the home for evidence. R. 887: 58-59. 
"She said yes. That's fine." R. 887: 58-59. 
When the misconduct is not extreme, "the lapse of time between the misconduct and 
the consent and the presence of intervening events becomes less critical to the dissipation of 
the taint." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264. The intervening events here, which further delayed 
the search, and the reconfirmation of Ms. Stovall's consent to search, are sufficient to 
dissipate any prior taint. Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
MANSLAUGHTER. 
Defendant next objects to Instruction No. 25 which explained the meaning of 
"extreme emotional disturbance'* under the lesser-included-offense of manslaughter. That 
instruction provided: 
For manslaughter to apply, the "extreme emotional disturbance" must be 
triggered by something external to the accused, and his reaction to such 
external stimulus must be reasonable Such disturbance, therefore, cannot 
have been brought about by the defendant's own peculiar mental processes 
or by his own knowing or intentional involvement in a crime. 
R. 589 (emphasis added) (the instructions discussed in this part are reproduced in Addendum 
G). Defendant argues that the last sentence is confusing because it could be read "to exclude 
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from consideration the offense of manslaughter once the jury determines the homicide was 
committed knowingly and intentionally, even when the accused suffers from an extreme 
emotional disturbance. Aplt. Brf. at 43-44. 
Defendant's argument lacks merit. The instruction simply and clearly instructs the 
jury that a defendant's "extreme emotional disturbance" cannot be triggered by the 
defendant's knowing or intentional involvement in a crime. It in no way affects the 
plausibility that a knowing and intentional murder could be reduced to a manslaughter 
offense if defendant acted under an extreme emotional disturbance. All that is proscribed by 
the instruction are those emotional disturbances brought on by the defendant's knowing or 
intentional participation in a crime. Nothing in the instruction is confusing. 
Moreover, any possible misconception about the instruction, however unreasonable, 
was certainly eliminated in Instruction No. 23, which read as follows: 
You are instructed that Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of 
Murder. After considering the elements of both offenses, if you find that the 
prosecution has not proven all of the elements of Murder beyond a reasonable 
doubt then you should consider whether or not the prosecution has proven all 
of the elements of manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition, even if you find that the prosecution has proven all of the 
elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, you must then go on to 
consider whether the defendant acted under the influence of an extreme 
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation. 
R. 587 (emphasis added). In other words, even if the jury found that the evidence proved all 
elements of intentional murder, the jury could only return a verdict for manslaughter if they 
found that he "acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance for which there 
is a reasonable explanation." R. 587. 
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This Court's decision in State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861 (Utah 1998), is 
dispositive. In that case, the Court upheld an instruction using identical language. 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 872. The Court rejected a claim similar to defendant's here and 
the Court's holding applies with equal force: 
[Defendant's] argument confuses knowledge and intent in causing the 
death of the victim with knowing or intentional involvement in a crime which 
in turn brings about an extreme emotional disturbance. The instruction merely 
explains that the manslaughter statute excludes defendant's intentional 
involvement in a crime from the class of circumstances that can give rise to an 
extreme emotional disturbance which mitigates murder to manslaughter. It 
says nothing about whether a defendant can intentionally kill another and still 
be guilty of manslaughter only. 
Id. Defendant has presented no viable reason for this Court to reconsider that holding.11 
Defendant argues that the court's alleged error in its instruction was compounded by 
its failure to give a proposed instruction that "[i]f [the jury] find[s] defendant committed a 
homicide, but there is reasonable doubt as to whether he committed murder or manslaughter, 
[the jury] may convict him only of the lesser included offense of manslaughter." Aplt. Brf. 
at 46. Because the Court properly instructed the jury, its refusal to give the proposed 
instruction could not compound any "error." Moreover, the instruction was unnecessary in 
light of the other instructions given. Both the elements instruction, R. 581, and Instruction 
No. 23, advised the jury that the State had to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Instruction No. 23 also made it clear that even if an intentional murder was proven, the jury 
was required to determine whether defendant "acted under the influence of an extreme 
llContrary to defendant's claim, the concern behind the red question mark next to 
the instruction, or who placed it there, whether judge, jury, or counsel, cannot be known. 
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emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation/' R. 587. Defendant's 
claim therefore fails. 
V. 
THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE DOES NOT MERGE INTO 
THE MURDER CHARGE. 
In his final claim on appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in not merging 
aggravated robbery with murder. Aplt. Brf. at 47. He reasons that under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402(3) (1999), he could not be convicted of both murder and aggravated robbery 
because the aggravated robbery was a lesser included offense of murder, charged here under 
three alternative theories, including felony murder. Aplt. Brf. at 47. 
Defendant relies on this Court's decision in State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 
1986), to support his claim. That case, however, involved a defendant's conviction for both 
aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, the predicate offense of the aggravated murder 
charge. Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1302. In contrast, this case involves defendant's conviction for 
non-capital murder based, under the felony murder alternative, on the predicate offense of 
aggravated robbery. Shaffer does not therefore apply. Instead, this case is governed by the 
Court's decision in State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990). 
As is in this case, the defendant in McCovey was convicted of aggravated robbery and 
murder, but not aggravated murder. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1234. The issue squarely before 
the Court in McCovey was "whether the legislature intended aggravated robbery to be a 
lesser included offense of second degree felony murder." Id. at 1235. The Court concluded 
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that it did not. Id. at 1239. Defendant argues that this case is distinguishable from McCo\ e\ 
because only one victim was involved here whereas different victims were involved in 
McCovey. Aplt. Brf. at 49-50. Although the Court in McCovey acknowledged a similar 
distinction between that case and Shaffer, the Court did not rely on that distinction alone. 
Indeed, that distinction bore no relevance to the Court's overriding conclusion that the 
purpose of the felony murder law is to "allow the State to obtain a second degree murder 
conviction without proving any form of mens rea" and thereby "deter the use of force or 
weapons in the commission of a felony." Id. at 1238. The Court reasoned that because 
Shaffer involved a capital murder conviction imposing penalties of death or life 
imprisonment, conviction of the predicate offense would be mere surplusage. Id. On the 
other hand, conviction for aggravated robbery "would not be needless or surplusage" in the 
case of a murder conviction because it only carries a sentence of five years to life. Id. That 
rationale applies with equal force whether different victims or only one victim is involved. 
The Court thus held that "the Utah State Legislature did not intend the multiple crimes 
of felony murder to be punished as a single crime, but rather, that the homicide be enhanced 
to second degree felony murder in addition to the underlying felony. To conclude otherwise 
would be to defeat the deterrent purpose of the felony murder statute and result in unjust 
consequences." Id. at 1239 (emphasis added). Nowhere does the statute differentiate 
between felony murders involving one victim or different victims and such a distinction 
would defeat the very purpose of the law as recognized in McCovey. 
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Moreover, the evidence was overwhelming that defendant knowingly and intentionally 
killed the victim. The victim was beaten badly. R. 890: 12-13,21-24,43-46,54-55,66-68, 
83, 103-05, 143. He had fled to his truck and was speeding away. R. 890: 144, 157. After 
defendant fired the first three rounds, the victim continued to flee in his truck. R. 890:25-27, 
70-71, 106-08, 123, 128-29, 145, 159. Nonetheless, defendant, in no danger whatsoever, 
persisted, finally killing the victim with one of his next successive rounds. R. 890: 145-46, 
159; R. 891: 183, 192, 197, 201, 245-47, 251-60, 269-70. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court correctly concluded the aggravated robbery 
conviction should not merge with the murder conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this ( \ day of January, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
=£* 
^FFREY S. GRAY \ ^ 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah 
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Addendum A 
U.S. Const, amend, IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise 
included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
Addendum B 
E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. No. 20000026-SC 
Russell Bisner, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Defendant's motion to dismiss this appeal without prejudice 
while the trial court considers defendant's motion to reconsider 
the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial is denied. It 
is well settled that a motion to reconsider one of the time-
extending motions of Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 59, Utah Rules Civil 
Procedure is not valid. Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 
P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991); Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 
415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966). Dismissal of this appeal would 
necessarily be with prejudice, resulting in loss of defendant's 
appeal. 
The trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider anything 
further in this case because defendant timely filed his notice 
of appeal on December 30, 1999. 
FOR THE COURT: 
3/. 2°°° ^CC ***" 
Date () Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
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43 E 400 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
RUSSELL BISNER, USP# 29334 
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and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand delivered to a personal 
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Addendum C 
SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT 
State OF UTAH V. DUSTIN SYMES 
CASE NO. 991900725fs 
JUDGE: HOMER F. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: KENT HOLLAND (ATD) 
ATTORNEY FOR PROSECUTION: ROBERT L. STOTT (ATP) 
CHARGE: AGG. ASSAULT, 3° 
DATE OF HEARING: 12/30/99 
1 JUDGE: State of Utah v. Dustin Svmes. This is the time set for sentencing --
2 inaudible-. 
3 ATD: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor. 
4 JUDGE: You may proceed. 
5 ATD: Your Honor, I have read the AP&P -inaudible- recommendations and 
6 although there's no recommended time, I agree with the fact that they believe that he 
7 is a suitable candidate for supervision. The circumstances in this particular instance, it 
8 was a matter of something escalating without any participation in the escalation by Mr. 
9 Symes. What I purport what happened in this case -inaudible- had Dustin and three 
10 of his friends went to where this, where the fight was supposed to be. When they got 
11 there they saw the deceased in his truck, standing in the door of his truck holding a 
12 firearm. At that time Dustin took a bat that he had in his truck out and he and the three 
13 approached the gentleman with the gun. Dustin struck the gentleman with the gun on 
14 the forehead. The gentleman put the gun down or dropped the gun-inaudible-. At that 
15 point Dustin said let's go. So Dustin left the scene, went back to his truck. The other 
16 three remained, two of them struck with their hands and fists the victim. And then they 
oo 
1 at Dustin's urging came to the truck. The victim was later killed and that's why we're 
2 here today. And I think the point is that there would be a real argument possibly, there 
3 was an argument for self defense, the fact that the one gentleman was holding, the 
4 victim was holding a loaded rifle at the time that Dustin struck him with the bat. He only 
5 struck him one time then he left the scene, -inaudible- down he said let's go. I think 
6 the other important thing to understand is that in the year that I have known Dustin and 
7 the -inaudible- I have seen a dramatic change in his personality. He has, he has 
8 matured. He is in a -inaudible- full time job and working towards an apprenticeship as 
9 an electrician. And he is a, I've seen a real change. He's done very very well. And he 
10 is not, he has gone from a young, kind of cocky individual to a very -inaudible-
11 individual. He understands the seriousness of what happened and the seriousness of, 
12 of the situation. I think it's important -inaudible— understands -inaudible- and how 
13 sorry he is that-inaudible-. He is responsible-inaudible-. 
14 JUDGE: -inaudible- State. 
15 
16 ATP. ROBERT L. STOTT 
17 ATP: Robert Stott for the State, Your Honor. You know, this is a case where 
18 -inaudible- three men, four men challenged -inaudible- parking lot early in the 
19 morning. One man -inaudible- other four. And after this defendant, Mr. Symes, hit him 
20 over the head with a bat. Mr. Symes then left, he went back to his truck. Two of the 
21 other individuals then hit Mr. Golub with -inaudible- and hands and then they left and 
22 went back to his truck. Mr. Golub got in his truck and was leaving. Mr. Bisner, who is 
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1 charged with murdering the victim, then picked up Mr. Golub's rifle and as Mr. Golub 
2 was leaving, he shot six times, killing Mr. Golub. Mr. Bisner is charged with murder -
3 inaudible-. In the beginning I charged Mr. Symes with aggravated assault -inaudible-
4 told Mr., told his attorney right from beginning that he had to plead guilty as charged. 
5 -inaudible- negotiations -inaudible-. After the trial on the other case, after seeing what 
6 happened, and after knowing that the two other individuals who were involved were not 
7 part of the murder were also -inaudible- sentencing involving Class A misdemeanor and 
8 -inaudible- jail time. I determined that -inaudible- sentence in this case from the 
9 standpoint of the District Attorney's office -inaudible- Class A, to give him probation and 
10 a condition of probation that he do at least four months -inaudible-. That is -inaudible-
11 - . I believe there are some family members here of the victim, Your Honor, and they 
12 may want to speak. 
13 ??: -inaudible-
14 
15 EDWARD GOLUB 
16 EDWARD: -inaudible- it all sounds good that he somehow was a nice person and he 
17 just happened to be driving around -inaudible- with a baseball bat and out of the blue 
18 three and his friends decided to go over and meet with my son and beat the daylights 
19 out of him. Now he can say all that he wants about the fact that it was self defense. 
20 The fact of the matter was that none of those four boys -inaudible- testimony in court 
21 ever felt threatened by my son. He put the gun-there's some consideration of the fact 
22 that the gun was being used to pay off a debt, and that's why the four walked up. 
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1 Otherwise, the four wouldn't have had, wouldn't have been that brave to walk up to a 
2 man with a gun who they thought was going to shoot 'em. And that's why he was 
3 defenseless, the gun was down according to testimony. And this gentleman over here 
4 hit my son over the head with a bat which ultimately led to his death. I think I wrote you 
5 a letter, I hope you read it, in which I said that to, to take-an act like that, a bat in 
6 January, he was looking for trouble. He even admits that he had the bat in his truck 
7 prior to this incident and I'm thinking what is he doing with a bat anyway, unless he's 
8 going to defend himself or he's going to get in trouble, an aggressive personality, walks 
9 up to my son who was standing relaxed and beats him in the head with a baseball bat 
10 and left a hole so large in his head that -inaudible- that if you had seen it you would 
11 have thought that was the entry wound of the bullet that killed him, not a baseball bat, 
12 it had punctured it so hard. Of course, my son dropped the gun, he laid it down, he fell 
13 down, beat the daylights out of him, and he was shot subsequently. My feeling is that 
14 you take this particular charge and drop it to a misdemeanor is an unjust -inaudible-
15 to my family, it's unjust. This boy deserves to go to jail, and he deserves to go to jail for 
16 a few years to cool his jets while he grows up. And he had the last six months -
17 inaudible- become a, he's got the fear of God into him, but that's temporary, he really 
18 hasn't changed and I think that he should go to prison, and he should be hit with that 
19 felony charge and not some four months in the county jail. Hell, the other boys served 
20 six months in the county jail and he never picked up the bat. All he did was use his fists 
21 and his, his feet kicking. I think that the request by the District Attorney-with all due 
22 respect-is not fair to myself and my family. 
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1 JUDGE: Thank you, sir. —inaudible— 
2 
3 EDDIE GOLUB 
4 EDDIE: I'm Eddie Golub, I'm Darby's little brother. I just would like to say that I 
5 know how it is to have friends that, you know, and do stupid things like what happened 
6 here. And I know my, I've got away from all those guys and I know my friends, I know 
7 that they were deranged people and if they wanted me to go do something, and I was 
8 smart enough to know, you know, I'm going to stay, you guys are crazy. And obviously 
9 he wasn't man enough to say hey, you know, I don't want to be a part of this and he 
10 could see where it was going. I, I think that he should have to pay, that he wasn't wise 
11 enough to see that his friends were crazy -inaudible-. And I don't know, if he isn't man 
12 enough to pay for what he's done then, I don't know, I just, I think -inaudible-. 
13 
14 NATALIE GOLUB 
15 NATALIE: My name's Natalie Golub -inaudible-. I sat there through the whole trial -
16 -inaudible-. And I don't know, I'm not sure. To, if someone was vicious enough to pull 
17 out a baseball bat and hit somebody with a baseball bat I -inaudible-. If there's 
18 anybody vicious enough, in my eyes, to bring a baseball bat to a fight than -inaudible-. 
19 And I've heard -inaudible- my husband. In my eyes, he's a horrible man, I don't see 
10 how anybody can -inaudible- that vicious -inaudible-. I think that if you, you give him 
11 a Class A misdemeanor he should -inaudible- enough to the point that my husband 
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1 died -inaudible-. I can't think about -inaudible- how much pain my husband had to 
2 have been in -inaudible-. It hurts me so much to think about it. 
3 JUDGE: Counsel? 
4 
5 ATP. KENT HOLLAND 
6 ??: Let me state -inaudible- made by Mr. Stott -inaudible- with Mr. Stott -
7 inaudible-. And I would still state to you that I -inaudible- much more, a lot more 
8 lenient, a lot more severe -inaudible-. 
9 ATP: -inaudible- recommendations -inaudible- for a couple of reasons. -
10 inaudible- important to understand that Mr. Symes did not strike -inaudible- over the 
11 head -inaudible-. At that point Mr. Symes turned and said let's leave, let's get out of 
12 here, and he left, he left the scene at that point. The other two gentleman that were 
13 sentenced as Class A's remained and beat Mr. Golub with their fists and their hands, 
14 which to me is a much severe situation than somebody who went and struck the 
15 gentleman once which caused him to put the rifle down. The -inaudible-, assaulted -
16 inaudible-. That is not someone who is there to -inaudible- or something for drugs or 
17 for whatever he was there for. A loaded assault rifle was not something you would fool 
18 around with. At that time Mr. Symes left. He then yelled at everybody, everybody to 
19 let's get, let's leave, let's go. Also, Mr. Golub was very, was, was not as severely injured 
20 such that he couldn't get in his truck and start to leave, because he did, he got in his 
21 truck and began to leave at which point he was shot by one of the remaining individuals 
22 six times. So this, this is a different situation. Here is something where somebody went, 
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1 they expected Mr. Golub to have a bunch of his friends there, that is why they all went 
2 because they thought he was coming with a large group. He showed up by himself with 
3 an assault, a loaded assault rifle. When they saw, when he saw the assault rifle that's 
4 when he went and got the bat and he approached him. At that point he struck him in 
5 the forehead with the end of the bat -inaudible- his forehead. The gun was placed 
6 either set down or dropped, one or the other. My client was not aware of what 
7 happened, he just knew that the gun was no longer in Mr. Golub's hands. He was 
8 holding it like this, he wasn't holding it anymore and at that point he left and went and 
9 got in his truck and yelled for everybody else to go. He tried to get everybody else to 
10 leave the scene. He tried to get everybody to quit, -inaudible- any physical, any 
11 further physical injury to Mr. Golub. He said let's go, let's get out of here. And at that 
12 point that's when the matter happened. I think that is why Mr. Stott -inaudible- in his, 
13 in his sentencing recommendations. He makes the recommendations -inaudible-
14 JUDGE: -inaudible-. Is there anything you want to state on your own behalf? 
15 
16 DUST1N SYMES 
17 DUSTIN: I would just like to apologize -inaudible-
18 
19 SENTENCE 
20 JUDGE: -inaudible- concern is that justice be done, -inaudible-. I'm not 
21 persuaded at this point that this -inaudible-. I'm also not persuaded that this gentleman 
22 should go to prison. It seems like to me this gentleman did try to, to alleviate the 
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1 situation, he walked away -inaudible- just shouldn't have been -inaudible-. Nine 
2 months in the Salt Lake County jail -inaudible- forthwith. That he be responsible for 
3 full restitution -inaudible-. That he enter into and complete any -inaudible- program 
4 that's recommended by the probation department, -inaudible- Odyssey House or 
5 Cornerstone, drug alcohol -inaudible-. That he pay a recoupment fee of two hundred 
6 dollars, that he obtain full time employment during, full time employment and/or school 
7 during the period of probation. And that he -inaudible-, that he not use any alcohol or 
8 do any drugs during the period of probation -inaudible-. That he -inaudible-, that he 
9 not frequent places where alcoholic beverages are sold or -inaudible- and that he not 
10 associate with known drug users -inaudible-. And that he have no contact with the 
11 victim's family -inaudible- this matter -inaudible-. Counsel? 
12 ??: -inaudible-
13 * END OF TRANSCRIPTION * 
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Addendum D 
FiUO DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY | If 19$ 
DAVID E. YOCUM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
SUSAN L. HUNT, Bar No. 6574 
Deputy District Attorney 
321 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Telephone: 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVTT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 
MAGISTRATE 
450 South State 
ADDRESS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned affiant, Mark Soper, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That your affiant has reason to believe 
That on the premises known as a house located at 9118 South Shad Circle 
In the City of Sandy, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 









Any ammunition including bullets, shotgun shells, centerfire cartridges. 
Black sweat pants or polar fleece pants. 
A navy t-shirt 
A long sleeved t-shirt and\or short-sleeved t-shirt 
A beanie type hat 
Any documents related to Russell Bisner's residence at 9118 Shad Circle in 
Sandy. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
8. Any documents related to Russell Bisner's ownership interest in any weapons or 
ammunition. 
9. Any documents related to Russell Bisner's ownership interest of any property 
described above or any property seized as evidence of the crime of homicide. 
10. Any spent shell casings. 
11. Any other fruits or instrumentalities that are evidence of the crime of criminal 
homicide. 
and that said property or evidence: 
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a 
public offense, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of 
homicide. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
1. Your affiant is a detective with the Sandy City Police Department. I have four 
years law enforcement experience with Sandy Police Department and Alpine Police Department. 
I am assigned to the Crimes Against Persons Investigations Unit 
2. At approximately 2:40 a.m. Sandy City Police Department received a call 
relating to a shooting that occurred in the area of 2095 East 9400 South. Officers responded to 
the scene where they located a shooting victim inside of a vehicle in a parking lot near an Amoco 
gas station and a Smiths Grocery Store at that location. Emergency Medical Personnel 
determined that the victim was deceased. The victim appeared to have at least one gunshot 
wound to the head. Officers also found several spent shell casings in the area. 
3. Sandy City Police Officer Severson questioned Michelle Koontz an employee of 
7-11 at 2175 East 9400 South, next to the parking lot where the victim was found. She told 
Officer Severson that her son, Justin Koontz had been at the 7-11 just prior to the shooting. She 
stated that he was with three friends. She stated that one of the friends with Justin was named 
Russell. She stated that Russell's last name starts with "Bis" but she was unsure of the exact last 
name. She stated that Russell was wearing black sweat pants or warm-up type pants. She 
further stated that she observed a silver chain hanging from the pocket of Russell's pants. 
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4. Ms. Koontz stated that she heard Justin and his friends talking about going to 
Smith's parking lot to fight someone. She stated that one of Justin's friends came into the 7-11 
and said "they're here." She said that Justin and his friends then left in a small black pick-up 
truck with a black shell. She stated that the shell was higher than the cab of the truck. Ms. 
Koontz and another clerk walked outside and saw the truck drive west from 7-11 to the Smith's 
store where another truck was parked. She stated that she heard arguing and then saw the 
second truck start to pull away. It was at that time that she heard gun shots and then saw the 
second truck crash. She stated that the truck her son was in drove away. 
5. Officers determined that the second truck Ms. Koontz saw was the same truck in 
which the shooting victim was found. 
6. Officers responded to Ms. Koontz' home at 2431 Woodchuck Way where they 
located Justin Koontz, and two other suspects. Justin Koontz' father was at the residence. He 
told officers that Russell Bisner called the residence shortly before the officers arrived. Russell 
asked to speak with Justin, but Mr. Koontz would not allow him to do so. Mr. Koontz told the 
officer that the number on the caller i.d. was Russell Bisner's number. 
7. Officers went to the home of Russell Bisner located at 9118 Shad Circle in 
Sandy. They called the residence and asked Russell to come outside. Russell went outside of 
the house where he was detained by the officers at the scene. 
8. Officers asked for permission from Russell's mother, Erin Stovall, to conduct a 
protective sweep of the residence for the safety of the officers and to determine if any other 
suspects were on the premises. No other suspects were identified at the home. 
9. After conducting the sweep of the home, Mrs. Stovall gave the officers 
permission to search the residence. Mrs. Stovall identified a downstairs bedroom as belonging to 
Russell. The doorway to the bedroom was approximately eight feet wide. There was no door. 
A curtain covered about half of the doorway. The inside of the bedroom was visible from a 
common area of the house. Mrs. Stovall also identified a storage area adjacent to the bedroom as 
an area Russell uses for his closet The closet area is visible from a common storage area of the 
house. 
10. During the protective sweep of the of the house, officers observed a gun rack on 
the floor of a downstairs bedroom. They observed a shotgun with a pistol grip and a SKS 
Assault Rifle on the rack. 
11. During the consent search of the house I also observed a wadded up dark navy 
blue t-shirt on the floor near the gun rack. I also observed black fleece sweat pants with a silver 
chain attached to the pants and a wallet The pants were located in a storage area adjacent to the 
bedroom. I did not move the pants, but I could see the trigger section or mid-section of what 
appeared to be a black rifle standing against a wall. The top of the gun was concealed under a 
coat. The bottom part was concealed under the black pants. The gun and the pants were visible 
from the common storage area of the basement 
10. Your affiant interviewed Erin Stovall who stated that Russell had been wearing 
black pants and two t-shirts the night before. She stated that one was long-sleeved and one was 
short sleeved. She said that she thought both the shirts were blue. She said that she thought 
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Russell was wearing a beanie type hat She also identified the area where the gun rack was 
observed as Russell's bedroom. She stated that the area where the black pants were seen is an 
area that Russell uses for his closet 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items: 
in the daytime. 





SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this £> day of January, 1999. 
MAGISTRATE 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AM) FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Mark Soper, I am 
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That on the premises known as A house located at 9118 South Shad Circle 
In the City of Sandy, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
1. Any firearms. 
2. Any ammunition including bullets, shotgun shells, centerfire cartridges. 
3. Black sweat pants or polar fleece pants. 
4. A navy t-shirt. 
5. A long sleeved t-shirt and/or short sleeved t-shirt. 
6. A beanie type hat. 
7. Any documents related to Russell Bisner's residence at 9118 Shad Circle in 
Sandy. 
8. Any documents related to Russell Bisner's ownership interest in any weapons or 
ammunition. 
9. Any documents related to Russell Bisner's ownership interest of any property 
described above or any property seized as evidence of the crime of homicide. 
10. Any spent shell casings. 
11. Any other fruits or instrumentalities that are evidence of the crime of criminal 
homicide. 
and that said property or evidence: 
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a 




consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct. 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of 
homicide. 
and that said property or evidence: 
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a 
public offense, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded 
in the daytime 
to make a search of the above-named or described premises known as A house located at 
9118 South Shad Circle for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the 
same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake 
Department, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject 
to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this jC_ day of January, 1999. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RUSSELL EUGENE BISNER, 
Defendant. 
FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Case No. 991900723FS 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
The defendant's Motion To Suppress came before the court on May 17, 1999, and the 
Court, having heard testimony and argument and having read the Motion and Response, makes 
the following Findings and Conclusions: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At approximately 2:40 A.M. on January 6, 1999, Officer Severson of the Sandy 
City Police Department responded to a mall parking lot at 20th East and 9400 South in Sandy, 
Utah pursuant to a shots fired call. 
2. At the scene he found a crashed truck containing the body of Darby Golub who 
had been shot in the back of his head. 
3. Michelle Koontz, an employee of a 7-11 Store across the street, told Officer 
Severson that just before the shooting, her son, Justin Koontz, and three other young males, 
including a Russell, who's last name started with "Bis", had stopped at the store just before the 
shooting. 
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4. Ms. Koontz heard the young men talking about going to the parking lot to fight 
someone. The men left in a truck and went to the parking lot across the street and stopped near 
another truck. 
5. Ms. Koontz heard arguing, and as the second truck pulled away, heard shots and 
saw the second truck crash. 
6. Ms. Koontz told Officer Severson that Russell "Bis" was wearing black 
sweatpants with a silver chain hanging from his pocket. 
7. Officer Severson went to Ms. Koontz' home where he talked with her husband. 
Mr. Koontz told Officer Severson that Russell Bisner had just called asking to talk with his son, 
Justin. Ms. Koontz gave the officers the number from which Russell had called. From that 
information, the officers were able to determine that he had called from 9118 South Shad Circle 
in Sandy. 
8. Two of the four suspects were arrested at the Koontz residence. 
9. Officer Severson, another Sandy officer, Cole, and three county deputies 
responded to the Shad Circle address. 
10. Outside the residence, Officer Severson called, on a phone, into the residence and 
spoke to Russell Bisner. He asked Bisner to come outside. When Bisner did, he was taken into 
custody. 
11. Officer Severson then spoke to Erin S to vail who identified herself as the home 
owner. At that time Severson knew that three of the four suspects were in custody, leaving one 
at large. Severson told Ms. Stovall that her son had possibly been involved in a shooting and that 
he wanted to make a cursory search of her home to determine if any other suspects were inside. 
Ms. Stowell gave her permission. During that time, the officers guns were holstered. 
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12. Officer Severson and another officer went down stairs where Ms. Stowell said 
that Russell Bisner's bedroom was located. No door was on the bedroom entry way and before 
they entered it, Officer Severson saw a gun rack holding a shotgun and rifle. The officer did not 
touch any items or seize any items from the bedroom or any other part of the basement, even 
after they had entered the bedroom to look for the fourth suspect. 
13. The officers conducted their basement survey in about five minutes. They then 
looked upstairs and found no traces of the fourth suspect. 
14. Officer Severson obtained a printed "permission to search" form from his vehicle. 
He explained its contents to Ms. S to vail. She read it, understood it, and signed it. At about 5:30 
A.M., her daughter, who was with her, signed it as a witness. 
15. The signed "permission to search" form was admitted into evidence. It fully and 
clearly stated her constitutional right to refuse a search of her residence by the officers. The 
form also stated that she willingly gave her permission for the police to complete a search of her 
premises and property and to take any property which they desired as evidence. 
16. Officer Severson did not search the Stovall residence, but waited a short time for 
Detective Soper to arrive. 
17. Detective Soper spoke with Mrs. Stovall in private about his desire to search her 
home for evidence. He confirmed that she had signed the "permission to search" form and 
additionally gained her verbal consent for the search. 
18. Detective Soper also learned from Mrs. Stovall that Russell's bedroom was in the 
basement and that while he had at some point paid rent, he didn't currently. 
19. Officer Soper searched the yard, garage, and the house. Downstairs, from a 
common living area, he saw the opening to Russell's bedroom. The opening was 8 feet wide, but 
half of it was covered. From outside the bedroom, through the opening, Soper could see items of 
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clothing on the bedroom floor. The clothing matched the description of the clothing that Ms. 
Stovall had told Soper that Bisner was wearing the night before. Soper also saw a gun rack 
containing a shotgun and rifle inside the bedroom. 
20. Detective Soper never entered the bedroom nor seized any item from it during this 
search. 
21. From a common storage area, Detective Soper observed a closet under the 
stairways. The closet had no door or covering and Soper saw in it black sweatpants with a silver 
chain attached to it. He also saw the mid, or trigger, section of a rifle standing in the closet. 
22. Detective Soper did not entered the closet, reach into it, or remove any item from 
it. 
23. Officer Soper left to obtain a search warrant for the residence. An officer was left 
at the house to see that the basement was not disturbed. 
24. With the assistance of Deputy District Attorney Susan Hunt, Detective Soper 
prepared a search warrant and affidavit. It was presented to Judge Fuchs of the Third Judicial 
District Court, who read it and executed the same. 
25. Detective Soper returned to the Stovall residence with the warrant and conducted 
a search pursuant to the warrant of the residence with other officers. 
26. From Russell Bisner's downstairs bedroom, the officers seized clothing, papers, 
and two firearms. 
27. From the storage closet under the stairs, the officers seized clothing, a chain, 
Russell's wallet, and two firearms. One, a rifle, was later determined to be the murder weapon. 
28. Erin Stovall was the owner of the residence at 9118 South Shad Circle in Sandy 
on January 6, 1999. When the officer arrived at her home, she said that she had nothing to hide 
and wanted to cooperate. She read the "permission to search" form and signed it. 
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29. Because of the inconsistencies between Ms. Stovall and Ms. Ferrell's testimonies, 
the highly charged emotional state of mind they were in at the time of the incident, and the fact 
that they had no notes or recorded statements to assist them, their testimony, as far as it 
conflicted with Officer Severson and Detective Soper, was not credible. 
30. The police did not claim an authority to search prior to obtaining the search 
warrant. 
31. No force, duress, deception, or coercion was employed by the officers during 
either pre-warrant search. 
32. Before Officer Severson made his sweep of the residence he asked Ms. Stovall for 
permission. She gave her verbal permission knowingly and intelligently. 
33. Before Detective Soper went downstairs the first time, he had received verbal and 
written permission from Ms. Stovall to conduct a search of her residence. She knowingly and 
intelligently gave her permission to search. 
Therefore, pursuant to these findings, the court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Ms. Stovall had the authority to consent to Officer Severson and Detective 
Soper's searches of her residence at 9118 South Shad Circle, Sandy, Utah, on Janaury 6, 1999. 
2. From the totality of the circumstances, Ms. Stovall's consent to search on both 
occasions was given voluntarily. 
3. Officer Severson possessed articulable facts which, taken together with the 
rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonable, prudent officer in believing that 
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the area to be swept harbored a murder suspect, who would either escape or who posed a danger 
to the officers and others if no sweep were made. 
4. Both pre-warrant searches conducted by Officer Severson and Detective Soper 
were valid and lawful. Neither violated any of the defendant's constitutional rights. 
5. Detective Soper's affidavit provided probable cause that evidence of a crime 
would be found at the residence of 9118 South Shad Circle, Sandy, Utah. 
6. Neither of the searches conducted prior to the obtaining of the search warrant, or 
anything observed during those searches, or any information obtained during these searches 
tainted the search warrant or affidavit. 
7. The only information gained from Officer Severson's sweep is contained in 
paragraph #10 of the search warrant affidavit. Even if that paragraph were excised from the 
affidavits, the remaining information establishes probable cause for the search. 
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PERMISSION TO SEARCH 
r/fa^S 
and / ^ '/*/ 
., have been informed by 
who made proper identification as an authorized law enforcement officer(s) of the Sandy City Police 
Department, Sandy, Utah, of my CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT not to have a search made of the premises 
and property owned by me and/or under my care, custody and control, without a search warrant. 
Knowing of my lawful right to refuse to consent to such a search, I willingly give my permission 
to the above named officer(s) to conduct a complete search of the premises and property, including all 
buildings and vehicles, both inside and outside of the property located at 
The above said officer(s) further have my permission to take from my premises and property, any letters, 
papers, or any other property or things which they desire as evidence for criminal prosecution on the 
case or cases under investigation. 
This written permission to search without a search warrant is given by me to the above officer(s) 
voluntarily and without any threats or promises of any kind, at O^JT^O hours, on 
this 6n± day of ~$AAJVAZ>/ , IQ ^°1 
•• ZM^dfA/,*/ Witness: 
Address: 





INSTRUCTION NO. 1 % 
Before you can convict the defendant, Russell Eugene 
Bisner, of the offense of Murder as charged in count I of the 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 6th day of January, 1999, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Russell Eugene 
Bisner, caused the death of Darby Golub; and 
2. That said defendant then and there did so: (a) 
intentionally or knowingly; or (b) intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, he committed an act clearly dangerous 
to human life, which act caused the death of Darby Golub; or (c) 
while in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate 
flight from the commission or attempted commission of Aggravated 
Robbery and/or Robbery, causes the death of Darby Golub. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Murder as charged in count I 
of the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty 
of count I. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3^> 
You are instructed that Manslaughter is a lesser included 
offense of Murder. After considering the elements of both 
offenses, if you find that the prosecution has not proven all of 
the elements of Murder beyond a reasonable doubt then you should 
consider whether or not the prosecution has proven all of the 
elements of manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition, even if you find that the prosecution has 
proven all of the elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must then go on to consider whether the defendant acted under the 
influence of an extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse. 
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In making your determination as to whether the defendant 
caused the death of the victim under the influence of extreme 
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse, the following principles apply: 
The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse is 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the offense. 
If the extreme emotional disturbance was a result of the 
defendant's own intentional, knowing or reckless acts, then 
manslaughter would not be a proper verdict. 
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For Manslaughter to apply, the "extreme emotional 
disturbance" must be triggered by something external to the 
accused, and his reaction to such external stimulus must be 
reasonable. The terms used must be given the meaning you would 
give them in common everyday use. Such disturbance, therefore, 
cannot have been brought about by the defendant's own peculiar 
mental processes or by his own knowing or intentional 
involvement in a crime. 
In determining whether or not the defendant acted under the 
influence of extreme emotional disturbance, you should consider 
all of the circumstances surrounding the death of Darby Golub. 
If you find that the defendant caused the death of Darby Golub 
while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, you 
must next determine whether or not there was a reasonable 
explanation or excuse for such disturbance. The reasonableness 
of the explanation or excuse for the extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance is to be determined from the viewpoint of a 
reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
Emotional disturbance does not include a condition resulting 
from a mental illness-. 
Additionally, the reasonableness of the belief of the 
defendant that the circumstances provided a legal justification 
or excuse for the defendant's conduct is to be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing 
circumstances. 
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